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Abstract: We consider optimal policy when private sector expectations are formed 
through adaptive learning. Earlier research has found that adaptive learning is consistent 
with empirical evidence on private sector expectations. In this paper, we consider the 
(admittedly) extreme case of sophisticated central banking, whereby the central bank has 
full knowledge about the structure of the economy. Our results confirm that the 
management of inflation expectations is crucial for the conduct of monetary policy. In 
particular, when the private sector perceives inflation persistence to be high, optimal 
policy responds strongly to lagged inflation and inflation shocks thereby stabilizing 
inflation and anchoring inflation expectations. In our particular example it does so at no 
cost for output gap stability. 
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Rational expectations (Muth, 1961) have become standard in modern macroeconomics. 
Researchers have systematically explored the implications of rational expectations for 
economic dynamics and for the conduct of policy. However, rational expectations 
(paraphrasing Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) assume economic agents who are extremely 
knowledgeable. A reasonable alternative is the assumption of adaptive learning. In this 
case, agents have limited knowledge of the precise working of the economy, but as time 
goes by and available data changes, they update their knowledge and the associated 
forecasting rule. Adaptive learning may be seen as a minimal departure from rational 
expectations, which accounts for imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy 
and the implications from pervasive structural change that characterizes modern 
economies. Moreover, some authors, for example Orphanides and Williams (2004) and 
Milani (2005), have found that adaptive learning models manage to reproduce important 
features of empirically observed expectations. 
Orphanides and Williams (2005) have shown that adaptive learning matters for how 
monetary policy should be conducted with a view to macroeconomic stability. They 
show, for the case of linear feedback rules, that inflation persistence increases when 
adaptive learning is substituted for rational expectations. They also show that a stronger 
response to inflation helps limiting the increase in inflation persistence. Thus, in such a 
context, a strategy of stricter inflation control helps to reduce both inflation and output 
gap volatility. 
This paper looks at the implications of private sector adaptive learning for the conduct of 
optimal monetary policy. We analyze the monetary policy response to shocks and the 
associated macro-economic outcomes, when the central bank minimizes an explicit loss 
  2function.
2 Modeling the optimal behavior of the central bank requires specifying its 
information set. In this paper, we consider the (admittedly) extreme case of sophisticated 
central banking, whereby the central bank has full information about the structure of the 
economy (a standard assumption under rational expectations). The information set 
therefore includes knowledge about the precise mechanism generating private sector’s 
expectations. The objective is to investigate to what extent the relatively small change in 
the assumption of how agents form their inflation expectations affects the principles of 
optimal monetary policy.  
Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) seminal contribution opened the way to considering the 
effects from systematic monetary policy actions and allowed for a theoretical account of 
important policy concepts such as credibility and reputation. In a world of rational 
expectations, policy-makers are (sufficiently) concerned about their long-run reputation 
so as not to yield to short-run temptations. The performance of the economy is better as a 
consequence. In a rational expectations framework, it is therefore possible to justify the 
primacy of long run goals such as price stability. Are similar considerations relevant 
when we depart from rational expectations? Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2005b) find that 
optimal policy under adaptive learning responds persistently to cost-push shocks. 
Through a persistent response to shocks, coupled with the optimal response to other state 
variables, optimal central banking under adaptive learning stabilizes inflation 
expectations, reduces inflation persistence and inflation variance at little cost in terms of 
output gap volatility. Persistent policy responses and well-anchored inflation expectations 
resemble optimal monetary policy under commitment and rational expectations. 
However, the mechanisms are very different. In the case of rational expectations, it 
operates through expectations of future policy. In the case of adaptive learning, it 
operates through a reduction in inflation persistence, as perceived by economic agents, 
given the past history determined by shocks and policy responses. In this paper, we build 
on this work by characterizing more fully optimal policy under adaptive learning and 
                                                           
2  In doing so, we build on Svensson’s (2003) distinction between “instrument rules” and “targeting rules”.  
An instrument rule expresses the central bank’s policy-controlled instrument, typically a short-term interest 
rate, as a function of observable variables in the central bank’s information set.  A targeting rule, in 
contrast, expresses it implicitly as the solution to a minimization problem of a loss function. 
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discretion and assuming rational expectations on the part of the private sector. Of course; 
there is no dichotomy between the two mechanisms anchoring inflation expectations. On 
the contrary, the central bank’s ability to influence expectations about the future course of 
policy rates and its track record in preserving stability are complements.  
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a simple New Keynesian 
model with adaptive learning. We also present our benchmark calibration assumptions. In 
section 3, we present the macro-economic outcomes under different policy regimes and 
characterize the optimal policy to state variables, especially to cost-push shocks, lagged 
inflation and perceived inflation persistence. Section 4 contains some robustness analysis 
with respect to different assumptions regarding the calibration. In section 5, we conclude. 
 
2.   New Keynesian model with adaptive learning. 
 
2.1.   A simple New Keynesian model of inflation dynamics under 
rational expectations 
 
Throughout the paper, we use the following standard New Keynesian model of inflation 
dynamics, which, as extensively discussed in Woodford (2003), can be derived from a 
consistent set of microeconomic assumptions:  
 (1)  () t t t t t t t u x + + − Ε = − + − κ γπ π β γπ π 1 1 , 
where  t π  is inflation,   is the output gap and   is a cost-push shock (assumed i.i.d.). 
Furthermore, β is the discount rate, κ is a function of the underlying structural parameters 
including the degree of Calvo price stickiness, 
t x
t u
α , and γ  captures the degree of intrinsic 
inflation persistence due to partial indexation in the goods market.  
Woodford (2003) has shown that, under the assumed microeconomic assumptions, a 
quadratic approximation of the (negative of the) period social welfare function takes the 
following form:  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Svensson stresses the importance of looking at optimal policy and targeting rules in order 
to understand modern central banking. 
  4 (2)   , 
2 2
1) ( t t t t x L λ γπ π + − = −
where  λ=κ/θ measures the relative weight on output gap stabilization and θ is the 
elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods.  
In the benchmark case, we assume that the central bank uses the social welfare function 
to guide its policy decisions, both under rational expectations and under private-sector 
learning.
3 A γ different from one implies that the optimal rate of inflation is zero 
(otherwise there will be inefficient dispersion of prices in the steady state) and we 
therefore assume that the inflation target (coinciding with the average level of inflation in 
the absence of an over-ambitious output-gap target) equals this level. To keep the model 
simple, we abstract from any explicit representation of the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy and simply assume that the central bank controls the output gap directly.  
As discussed in the introduction, we consider two assumptions regarding the formation of 
inflation expectations in equation (1): rational expectations and adaptive learning. In this 
subsection, we first solve for optimal policy under discretion and rational expectations. 
This will serve as a benchmark for the analysis of optimal policy under adaptive learning.  
Defining zt =πt-γπt-1, equations (1) and (2) can be rewritten as: 
(1’)  t t t t t u x z E z + + = + κ β 1  
(2’)    . 2 2
t t t x z L λ + =
In this formulation, there are no endogenous state variables and since the shocks are iid, 
the rational expectations solution (which by the way coincides with the standard forward-
looking model) must have the property Εtzt+1 = 0. Thus: 
(1’’)      t t t u x z + =κ  
Hence, the problem reduces to a static optimization problem. Substituting (1’’) into (2’) 
and minimizing the result with respect to the output gap, implies the following policy 
rule:  
                                                           
3 It is clear that it matters at which stage of the analysis learning is introduced. In this paper, we follow the 
convention in the adaptive learning literature and assume that the structural relations (besides the 
expectations operator) remain identical when moving from rational expectations to adaptive learning. 
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Under the optimal discretionary policy, the output gap only responds to the current cost-
push shock. In particular, following a positive cost-push shock to inflation, monetary 
policy is tightened and the output gap falls. The strength of the response depends on the 
slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, κ, and the weight on output gap stabilization 
in the loss function, λ.
4  
Using (3) to substitute for xt in (1’’) and the definition of zt  implies:  





+ = .                                                                                                             
Or, expressing inflation directly as a function of the output gap: 
(5)        t 1 - t t x -
κ
λ
γπ π = .                                                                                                    
This equation expresses the usual tradeoff between inflation and output gap stability in 
the presence of cost-push shocks. In the standard forward-looking model (corresponding 
to γ=0), there should be an appropriate balance between inflation and the output gap. The 
higher the λ, the higher is inflation in proportion to (the negative of) the output gap, 
because it is more costly to move the output gap. When κ increases, inflation falls 
relative to the output gap. When γ>0, it is the balance between the quasi difference of 
inflation and the output gap that matters. If last periods inflation was high, there is a 
tendency that current inflation should also be high. The reason is that price dispersion 
drives the welfare criterion. When prices are partially indexed to lagged inflation, other 
prices must rise in prroportion to this indexation in order to avoid price dispersion.  
Using equations (3) and (4) to substitute for xt and πt in the static loss function leads to: 
 
                                                           
4  The reaction function in (3) contrasts with the one derived in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999). They 
assume that the loss function is quadratic in inflation (instead of the quasi-difference of inflation, zt) and the 
output gap. They find that, in this case, lagged inflation appears in the expression for the reaction function, 
corresponding to optimal policy under discretion. 
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The loss is an increasing function of the variance of the shocks and of the weight of the 
output gap in the loss function and a decreasing function of the slope of the Phillips 
curve. 
As shown above, under discretion optimal monetary policy only responds to the 
exogenous shock and not to lagged inflation. In contrast, if the central bank is able to 
credibly commit to future policy actions, optimal policy will feature a persistent “history 
dependent” response, as discussed extensively in Woodford (2003). The relevant 
mechanism relies on the fact that, under optimal policy, perceptions of future policy 
actions help stabilize current inflation, through expectations. Specifically, by ensuring 
that, under rational expectations, a decline in inflation expectations is associated with 
positive cost-push shock, optimal policy manages to spread the impact of the shock over 
time. 
 
2.2.   Inflation expectations according to adaptive learning.    
 
In this section we specify the model under adaptive learning. As shown in equation (4), 
under rational expectations and discretionary monetary policy, the only endogenous state 
variable is lagged inflation and hence the equilibrium dynamics of inflation will follow a 
first-order autoregressive process: 
(4’)  t t t u ~
1 + = − ρπ π  
Moreover, the degree of reduced-form inflation persistence is given by the degree of 
inflation indexation in (1), i.e.  γ ρ =  and   = λ/(κ t u ~ 2+λ)ut  . 
Under adaptive learning, we assume that the private sector believes the inflation process 
is well approximated by equation (5). However, as they do not know the underlying 
parameters, they estimate the equation recursively, using a “constant-gain” least squares 
algorithm, implying perpetual learning.  
  7Thus, the agents estimate the following reduced-form equation for inflation,
5
(6)  t t t t c ε π π + = −1 .           
Agents are bounded rational because they do not take into account the fact that the 
parameter c varies over time. The c parameter captures the estimated, or perceived, 
inflation persistence. 
The following equations describe the recursive updating of the parameters estimated by 
the private sector. 
(7)      ) ( 1 1 1
1
1 − − −
−
− − + = t t t t t t t c R c c π π π φ
(8)           ), R ( R R 1 t
2
1 t 1 t t − − − − + = π φ
where φ  is the gain. Note that due to the learning dynamics the number of state variables 
is expanded to four: ut, πt-1, ct-1,  Rt,  The last two variables are predetermined and known 
by the central bank at the time they set policy at time t.  
A further consideration regarding the updating process concerns the information the 
private sector uses when updating its estimates and forming its forecast for next period’s 
inflation. We assume that agents use current inflation when they forecast future inflation, 
but not in updating the parameters. This implies that inflation expectations, in period t, 
for period t+1 may be written simply as: 
(9)  t t t t c π π 1 1 − + = Ε  
Generally, there is a simultaneity problem in forward-looking models combined with 
learning. In (1), current inflation is determined, in part, by future expected inflation. 
However, according to (9), expected future inflation is not determined until current 
inflation is determined. Moreover, in the general case also the estimated parameter, c, 
will depend on current inflation. The literature has taken (at least) three approaches to 
this problem. The first is to lag the information set such that agents use only t-1 inflation 
when forecasting inflation at t+1, which was the assumption used in Gaspar and Smets 
(2002). A different and more common route is to look for the fixed point that reconciles 
                                                           
5  We assume that the private sector knows the inflation target (equal to zero). In future research, we intend 
to explore the implications of learning about the inflation target. 
  8both the forecast and actual inflation, but not to allow agents to update the coefficients 
using current information (i.e. just substitute (9) into (1) and solve for inflation). This has 
the benefit that it keeps the deviation from the standard model as small as possible (also 
the rational expectations equilibrium changes if one lags the information set), while 
keeping the fixed-point problem relatively simple. At an intuitive level, it can also be 
justified by the assumption that it takes more time to re-estimate a forecasting model, 
rather than to apply an existing model. Finally, a third approach is to also let the 
coefficients be updated with current information. This results in a more complicated 
fixed-point problem.
6  
Substituting equation (9) into the New-Keynesian Phillips curve (1) we obtain: 















2.3.   Solution method for optimal monetary policy 
 
Under adaptive learning we want to distinguish between the case where the central bank 
follows a simple rule (specifically the rule given in equation (3)) and fully optimal policy 
under the loss function (2). In the first case, the simple rule (3), the Phillips curve (1) and 
equations (7), (8) and (9), which describe the evolution of private sector expectations, 
determine the dynamics of the system. Standard questions, in the adaptive learning 
literature, are whether a given equilibrium is learnable and which policy rules lead to 
convergence to rational expectations equilibrium. By focusing on optimal policy, we aim 
at a different question. Namely:  suppose the central bank knows fully the structure of the 
model including that agents behave in line with adaptive learning, what is the optimal 
policy response? And, how will the economy behave? In this case, the central banker is 
well aware that policy actions influence expectations formation and thereby inflation 
dynamics. To emphasize that we assume the central bank knows everything about the 
expectations’ formation mechanism, we have in another paper (see Gaspar, Smets and 
Vestin (2005a)) labeled such extreme case “sophisticated” central banking 
                                                           
6  It is possible to solve this problem in the current setting. However, we leave this for future research. 
  9“Sophisticated” central banking implies solving the full dynamic optimization problem, 
where the parameters associated with the estimation process are also state variables.  
Specifically, in this case the central bank solves the following dynamic programming 
problem: 
(11)            ( )
, ) (
2
max ) ( , 1 , , 1
2 2
1 ,











− = + +
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t t t t c R u V
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π   
subject to equation (10) and the recursive parameter updating equations (7) and (8).
7  
The solution characterizes optimal policy as a function of the states and parameters in the 
model, which we may write simply as: 
(12)      ) ( , 1 , 1 , t t t t t R c u x − − = π ψ . 
As shown in the appendix (to be completed), equation (12) can be written as: 































where  R t t V E βφ δ 2 1− = , ) c ( 1 1 t t − − + = γ β χ  and  ,   and   denote the partial 
derivatives of the value function with respect to the variables indicated in the subscript. 
Equation (13) does not characterize the optimal solution fully as we have not specified 
the exact forms of the partial derivatives, but it will be important to interpret the results in 
section 3.
c V π V R V
8  
The presence of learning instead of fully rational agents introduces three modifications 
relative to the standard framework under rational expectations. First, the agents simply 
run their regression and make their forecast, so that actual inflation is not the outcome of 
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λ γπ π β , that is as 
maximizing the negative of the loss. It is important to bear this in mind when interpreting first order 
conditions. 
8 Clearly the partial derivatives  ,   and  are functions of the state vector  c V π V R V ) 1 , , , 1 ( + + t R t c t t u π . 
  10a game between the central bank and the private sector (as is the case under discretion 
and rational expectations). Second, promises of future policy play no role as agents look 
only at inflation outcomes. Hence, there is no scope for the type of commitment gains 
discussed in the rational expectations literature. Third, we leave the linear-quadratic 
world, as the learning algorithm makes the model non-linear.  
From a technical perspective, the first two aspects simplify finding the optimal policy 
whereas the third is a complication. The value function will not be linear-quadratic in the 
states and hence we employ the collocation-methods described in Judd (1998) and 
Miranda and Fackler (2002) to solve the model numerically. This amounts to 
approximating the value function with a combination of cubic splines and translates in a 
root finding exercise (some details are outlined in the appendix). 
 
2.4.   Calibration of the model 
In order to study the dynamics of inflation under adaptive learning we need to make 
specific assumptions about the key parameters in the model. In the simulations, we use 
the set of parameters shown in Table 1 as a benchmark. 
[Insert Table 1] 
Coupled with additional assumptions on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption and the elasticity of labor supply these structural parameters imply that 
κ=0.019; λ= 0.002.
  9 γ is chosen such that there is some inflation persistence in the 
benchmark calibration. A value of 0.5 for γ is frequently found in empirically estimated 
new Keynesian Phillips curves (see, for example, Smets, 2002). θ=10 corresponds to a 
mark-up of about 10%. α is chosen such that the average duration of prices is three 
quarters; which is consistent with US evidence. The constant gain, φ, is calibrated at 0.02. 
Orphanides and Williams (2004) found that a value in the range 0.01 to 0.04 is needed to 
match up the resulting model-based inflation expectations with the Survey of 
                                                           
9 Here we follow the discussion in Woodford (2003). See especially pages 187 and 214-15. For the relevant 
parameters we rely on ... 
  11Professional Forecasters. A value of 0.02 corresponds to an average sample length of 
about 25 years.
  10 In the limiting case, when the gain approaches zero, the influence of 
policy on the estimated inflation persistence goes to zero and hence plays no role in the 
policy problem.  
  
3.   Optimal monetary policy under adaptive learning 
 
In this section, we first discuss the macro-economic performance under adaptive learning. 
We compare the outcomes under rational and adaptive expectations for both optimal 
monetary policy and the simple policy rule given by equation (3) above. Next, we 
characterize optimal monetary policy by looking at the shape of the policy function and 
mean dynamic impulse responses following a cost-push shock. Finally, we present some 
sensitivity analysis for different parameters of the economy and a different weight on the 
output gap in the central bank’s loss function.  
 
3.1.   Optimal monetary policy, persistence and macroeconomic 
performance  
Table 2 compares, for our benchmark calibration, four cases: optimal policy under 
commitment and rational expectations (first column); optimal policy under adaptive 
learning (third column) and the simple rule (equation (3)), both under rational 
expectations (second column) and adaptive learning (last column). It is instructive to start 
walking a well-trodden path comparing the outcomes under commitment and discretion, 
under rational expectations. For such a case it has been shown (see, for example, Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003)) that commitment implies a long-lasting 
response to cost-push shocks persisting well after the shock has vanished from the 
economy. As already stated above, the intuition is that generating expectations of a 
reduction in the price level, in the face of a positive cost-push shock, optimal policy 
reduces the immediate impact of the shock, spreading it over time. With optimal policy 
                                                           
10 See Orphanides and Williams (2004). Similarly, Milani (2005) estimates the gain parameter to be 0.03 
using a Bayesian estimation methodology. 
  12under commitment, inflation expectations operate as automatic stabilizers in the face of 
cost-push shocks. Such intuition is clearly present in the results presented in Table 2. 
Clearly, the output gap is not persistent under the simple rule, (under the assumption that 
cost-push shocks are i.i.d.). In contrast, under commitment the output gap becomes very 
persistent with autocorrelation of 0.66. The reverse is true for inflation. Inflation 
persistence, under the simple rule, is equal to the assumed intrinsic persistence parameter 
at 0.5. Under commitment it comes down to only 0.24. Continuing the comparison 
between optimal policy under commitment and the simple rule under rational 
expectations, we see that inflation variance is about 85 % higher under the simple rule 
and the variance of the quasi-difference of inflation is about 37% higher. At the same 
time, output gap volatility is only about 5 % lower. The reduction in output gap volatility 
illustrates the stabilization bias under optimal discretionary monetary policy. Overall, the 
loss is about 28 % higher under discretion. 
[Insert Table 2] 
Following Orphanides and Williams (2002), it is also useful to compare the outcomes 
under rational expectations and adaptive learning for the case of the simple monetary 
policy rule, looking at the second and fourth columns in Table 2. The comparison 
confirms their findings. Clearly, the autocorrelation and the volatility of the output gap 
remain unchanged at zero as under the same simple rule the output gap only responds to 
the contemporary iid cost-push shock. Nevertheless, under adaptive learning, the 
autocorrelation of inflation increases from 0.5 to about 0.56. The variance of inflation 
increases to more than twice the value under commitment, and the variance of the quasi-
difference of inflation is about 1.5 times larger. Thus, the expected welfare loss increases 
significantly to about 37% more, than in the case of commitment, and about 9 percentage 
points more than under the same rule and rational expectations. The intuition is that, 
under adaptive learning, economic agents perceive inflation as more persistent. Thus, 
inflation expectations operate as an additional channel magnifying the immediate impact 
of cost-push shocks and contributing to the persistence of their propagation in the 
economy. The increase in persistence and volatility are intertwined with dynamics 
induced by the learning process. 
  13Optimal central banking under adaptive learning is able to improve outcomes 
significantly relative to the simple rule (as it is clear from comparing the third and the 
fourth column in Table 2). Responding persistently to cost-push shocks, optimal policy 
reduces sharply the degree of perceived inflation persistence, to about 0.36, and the 
persistence of inflation. As before, this is linked with a significant decline in inflation 
volatility relative to the simple rule. Inflation variance declines 90 percentage points to 
about only 28% more than in case of commitment. The variance of the quasi-difference 
of inflation also falls by about 35 percentage points. At the same time, the output gap 
becomes more persistent, with auto-correlation of 0.51 (still less than under commitment) 
while the volatility of the output gap is unchanged relative to the simple rule. On balance, 
the expected welfare loss falls significantly, by about 28 percentage points under optimal 
policy against the simple rule (which compares with a similar gain of about 28 % for 
commitment over the simple rule, for rational expectations). Interestingly, optimal policy 
under adaptive learning brings us close to the results under commitment, as we can see 
from a comparison between the first and the third column in Table 2. Indeed, the output 
gap exhibits significant persistence and inflation is much less persistent than under the 
simple rule. Moreover, inflation volatility is sharply reduced at little (or no) cost in terms 
of output gap volatility. Notwithstanding this, optimal monetary policy under adaptive 
learning is unable, for our benchmark calibration, to reap all the benefits from a 
commitment regime, under rational expectations. 
Finally, in the last line of Table 2, we show the variance of the forecast error relative to 
the case of commitment. As stated above the average forecast error is zero in all cases. 
The variance of the forecast errors, under adaptive learning, is inside the range defined 
under rational expectations, by commitment and the simple rule, for the case of full 
optimal policy and about  ... % above, for the case of the simple rule. Such results 
confirm the intuition that our adaptive learning approximation is “reasonable”. 
Figure 1 provides some additional detail concerning the distribution of the endogenous 
variables, i.e. the estimated persistence, output gap, inflation, quasi-difference of 
inflation, and the moment matrix, under optimal policy and the simple policy rule. First, 
panel (a) shows not only that the average of the estimated persistence parameter is 
significantly lower under optimal policy, but also that the distribution is more 
  14concentrated around the mean. It is important to note that, under optimal policy, the 
perceived inflation parameter does never go close to one, contrary to what happens under 
the simple rule. In fact, the combination of the simple policy rule and private sector’s 
perpetual learning at times gives rise to explosive dynamics, when perceived inflation 
persistence goes to (or above) unity
11. In order to portray the long run distributions, we 
have excluded explosive paths by assuming (following Orphanides and Williams, 2004) 
that when perceived inflation reaches unity the updating stops, until the updating pushes 
the estimated parameter downwards. Naturally, this assumption leads to underestimating 
the risks of instability under the simple rule. In Gaspar, Smets and Vestin (2005a) we 
looked at the transition from an economy, regulated by a simple rule, taking off on an 
explosive path to the anchoring of inflation through optimal policy. Optimal monetary 
policy under adaptive learning succeeds in excluding such explosive dynamics.   
Second, panels (b), (c) and (d) confirm the results reported in Table 2.  Under the optimal 
policy, the distributions of inflation (panel c) and of the quasi-difference of inflation 
(panel d) become more concentrated. At the same time, the distributions of the output 
gap, in panel (d), are very similar confirming the result that the variances of the output 
gap under the two regimes are identical.  Finally, the distribution of the R matrix also 
shifts to the left and becomes more concentrated under optimal policy, reflecting the fact 
that the variance of inflation falls relative to the simple rule. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Overall, optimal monetary policy under adaptive learning shares some of the features of 
optimal monetary policy under commitment. To repeat, in both cases persistent responses 
to cost-push shocks induce a significant positive autocorrelation in the output gap, 
leading to lower inflation persistence and volatility, through stable inflation expectations. 
Nevertheless, the details of the mechanism, leading to these outcomes must be 
substantially different. As we have seen, under rational expectations commitment works 
through the impact of future policy actions on current outcomes. Under adaptive learning, 
the announcement of future policy moves is, by assumption, not relevant. We devote the 
                                                           
11 Similar results, for the case of a Taylor rule, are reported by Orphanides and Williams (2004). 
  15rest of the section to characterizing optimal monetary policy under adaptive learning and 
how it works. 
 
3.2.   Optimal monetary policy: how does it work? 
As we have discussed before optimal policy may be characterized as a function of the 
four state variables in the model:  ) ( R c u , 1 , 1 , t t t t − − π . We want to recall equation (13),  































where  R t t V E βφ δ 2 1− = , ) c ( 1 1 t t − − + = γ β χ  and  ,   and   denote the partial 
derivatives of the value function with respect to the variables indicated in the subscript. 
Equation (13) expresses the policy instrument – here taken to be the output gap x
c V π V R V
t – as a 
function of its determinants. When interpreting equation (14) there are two important 
points to bear in mind. First, the partial derivatives V , V  and V  depend on the vector 
of states 
c π R
) 1 , , , 1 ( + + t R t c t t u π . Second, the value function is defined in terms of a maximization 
problem. In such a case, a positive partial derivative means that an increase in the state 
contributes favorably to our criterion. Or, more explicitly, that it contributes to a 
reduction in the loss. 
In order to discuss some of the intuition behind the optimal policy reaction function, it is 
useful to consider a number of special cases. In particular, in the discussion in this sub-
section, we assume that   is zero, so that the expected marginal impact of changes in 
the moment matrix on the value function is zero. Such assumption provides a reasonable 
starting point for the discussion for reasons, which we will make clear in the next sub-
section. If   is zero then 
R tV E
= R tV E 1 t δ , making equation (14) much simpler. 
If lagged inflation is equal to zero, πt-1=0, the optimal monetary policy reaction can be 
simplified to the following expression: 
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− = . 
Clearly, in such a case the second term in equation (14) is zero. Moreover, it can be 
shown that for  0 = 1 − t π ,   is zero. When lagged inflation is zero, the effects of 
positive and negative cost-push shocks are exactly symmetric. The intuition is that, 
starting from zero inflation; deflationary shocks and inflationary shocks are exactly as 
bad. Since the shocks are uncorrelated over time and symmetrically distributed, it follows 
that   must be zero.  
π tV E
V E π t
Thus, when lagged inflation is zero, πt-1=0, optimal monetary policy amounts to a simple 
response to the cost-push shock. Moreover, if in addition  = −1 t γ c
2
 and as a result 
= t χ t χ =1, equation (14) reduces to the simple rule derived under rational expectations 
given by equation (3). In other words, when lagged inflation is zero and the estimated 
inflation persistence is equal to the intrinsic persistence, the optimal monetary policy 
response to a shock under adaptive learning coincides with the optimal response under 
discretion and rational expectations.  
The reason for this finding is quite simple. From equation (7), it is clear that, when 
lagged inflation is zero, the estimated persistence parameter is not going to change 
irrespective of current policy actions. As a result, no benefit can possibly materialize 
from trying to affect the perceived persistence parameter. The same intuition holds true to 
explain why when φ =0 the solution under fully optimal policy coincides with (3), 
meaning that the simple rule would lead to full optimal policy.  
Consider now the case when estimated persistence is lower than intrinsic persistence, 
1 t c − > γ  (still maintaining the assumption that πt-1=0). This is the case which will on 









2 , showing that the response is more muted than under discretion and 
rational expectations. The reason is again simple. As shown in equation (10), the smaller 
  17the degree of perceived inflation persistence, the smaller the impact of a given cost-push 
shock on inflation, all other things constant. As a result, it is optimal for the central bank 
to mute its response to the cost-push shock. This clearly illustrates the first-order benefits 









2 , the response of optimal policy to cost push shocks becomes 
stronger than under the simple rule.  
In Figure 2, we show the mean dynamics response of the output gap, inflation and 
estimated persistence to a one-standard deviation (positive) cost push shock, taking 
lagged inflation to be initially zero, for different levels of perceived (or estimated) 
inflation persistence on the side of the private sector. Panel a) confirms the finding 
discussed above that as estimated persistence increases so does the output gap response 
(in absolute value). The stronger policy reaction helps mitigating the inflation response, 
although it is still the case (from panel b) that inflation increases by more when estimated 
inflation persistence is higher. This illustrates the worse trade-off the central bank is 
facing when estimated persistence is higher. Finally, from panel c) it is apparent that the 
estimated persistent parameter adjusts gradually to its equilibrium value, which is lower 
than the degree of intrinsic persistence. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
 
Returning to equation (13) and departing from the assumption that πt-1=0, we can discuss 
the second term, which captures part of the optimal response to lagged inflation. Note 
that the first term in the numerator is zero when  1 t− c = γ  (still using the simplifying 
assumption that  1 = t δ ). In such a case, inflation expectations adjust to past inflation just 
in line with the partial adjustment of inflation due to its intrinsic persistence (equation 
11). Given the loss function this is a desirable outcome. In the absence of any further 
shock, inflation will move exactly enough so that the quasi-difference of inflation will be 
zero. Note that when  1 t− c > γ  or  1 > t χ  the response of the output gap to past inflation, 
  18according to this effect, is positive. Hence, past inflation justifies expansionary policy. At 
first sight, this is counter-intuitive. However, the reason is clear, when estimated 
persistence is below intrinsic persistence, past inflation does not feed enough into 
inflation expectations, to stabilize the quasi-difference of inflation. In order to approach 
such a situation an expansionary policy must be followed. This factor is important 
because it shows that, in the context of our model, there is a cost associated with pushing 
the estimated persistence parameter too low.  
However, in general, the second term in the numerator of the reaction coefficient will be 
negative and dominate the first term ensuring a negative response of the output gap to 
inflation. This term reflects the intertemporal trade-off the central bank is facing between 
stabilizing the output gap and steering the perceived degree of inflation persistence by 
inducing forecast errors. In our simulations it turns out that the expected marginal cost 
(the marginal impact on the expected present discounted value of all future losses) of 
letting estimated inflation persistence increase is always positive, i.e.  and large. 
The intuition is that, as discussed above, a lower degree of perceived persistence will lead 
to a much smaller impact of future cost-push shocks on inflation, which tends to stabilize 
inflation, its quasi-difference and the output gap. As a result, under optimal policy the 
central bank will try to lower the perceived degree of inflation persistence. As is clear 
from the private sector’s updating equation (7), it can do so by engineering unexpectedly 
low inflation when past inflation is positive and conversely by unexpectedly reducing the 
degree of deflation when past inflation is negative. In other words, in order to reap the 
future benefits of lowering the degree of perceived inflation persistence, monetary policy 
will tighten if past inflation is positive and will ease if past inflation is negative. Overall, 




1 t− γ , when the first term in the denominator cancels out.  
Finally, the third term in equation (13) is also interesting. We have already seen that 
when  πt-1=0,  =0 and this term plays no role. Now, if π ) V ( E
) V ( E
t π t-1>0, and ut=0 then 
<0 and this will reinforce the negative effect of inflation on the output gap 
discussed above. More explicitly, if lagged inflation is positive, this term will contribute 
t π
  19to a negative output gap – tight monetary policy - even in the absence of a contemporary 
shock. This effect will contribute to stabilizing inflation close to zero. In the case πt-1<0, 
and ut=0, in contrast  >0. Thus, when lag inflation is negative, this term will 
contribute to a positive output gap – loose monetary policy – even in the absence of a 
contemporary shock. Again this effect will contribute to stabilizing inflation close to 
zero. 
) V ( Et π
Figures 3a and 3b summarize some of the important features of the shape of the policy 
function (13) in the calibrated model. Figure 3a plots the output gap (on the vertical axis) 
as a function of lagged inflation and the perceived degree of inflation persistence for a 
zero cost-push shock and assuming that the moment matrix R equals its average for a 
particular realization of c. A number of features are worth repeating. First, when lagged 
inflation and the cost-push shock are zero, the output gap is also zero irrespective of the 
estimated degree of inflation persistence. Second, when the shock is zero, the response to 
inflation and deflation is symmetric. Third, as the estimated persistence of inflation 
increases, the output gap response to inflation (and deflation) rises. It is then interesting 
to see how the output gap response differs when a positive cost-push shock hits the 
economy. This is shown in Figure 3b, which plots the differences in output gap response 
to a positive one-standard deviation cost-push shock and zero cost-push shock as a 
function of lagged inflation and the perceived persistence parameter. The output gap 
response is always negative and increases with the estimated degree of inflation 
persistence. The figure also shows the non-linear interaction with lagged inflation. In 
particular, the output gap response becomes stronger when inflation is already positive.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
Finally, it is also interesting to ask whether the symmetric response of optimal policy to 
inflation and deflation is more general. More formally, does the following equality hold?  
(16)           ) ( ) ( , 1 , 1 , , 1 , 1 , t t t t t t t t R c u R c u − − − − − − = − π ψ π ψ  
The answer is yes, as we illustrate in figure 4, for the case of a positive (negative) cost-
push shock when lag inflation is negative (positive). The policy response, apparent in 
  20panel (b), is fully symmetric. Moreover, from the panel (a) of Figure 4 it is clear that the 
adjustment of inflation is also symmetric. Finally, panel (d) shows that the adjustment of 
estimated persistence is the same in both cases (the small discrepancy in the figure is due 
to the numerical accuracy of our numerical procedure). The same would be true of the 
moment matrix (not shown). 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
3.3.  The role of VR. 
When interpreting equation (13) in the previous section, we assumed that  . In 
our simulations V
0 = R tV E
R is, on average, positive but small. Under such conditions, it is clear 
that although the expected value of VR may depart from zero δt will be close to one most 
of the time. In fact the average of VR is about 1/3, which makes δ≅0.987. The standard 
deviation of VR is about 1.2, implying that  0.939<δ<1.0343 for values of VR within a 
plus or minus 1-SD band. Thus, the arguments in sub-section 3.2 hold approximately in 
many relevant cases.  
To understand the behavior of VR it is useful to note, from equation (7), that a high value 
of R reduces the updating of the estimated persistence parameter for a given residual 
) ( c 1 t t t π π −
0 <
R c u
+ . Now, the stability of estimated persistence is good when it is low, 
remember that V  and large in absolute value. However, when c is high, and optimal 
policy will imply that it must be reduced, a high value of R is problematic because it 
implies that extra effort will be necessary to bring it down. Thus, it is intuitive that V
c
R 
does register positive and negative values. Furthermore, it is worthwhile to point out that 
high values of estimated persistence are, in general, associated with large values of R. 
The partial derivative of the value function with respect to the moment matrix, VR , 
depends on the state variables  ) 1 , , , 1 ( + + t t t t π . Given the state variables, at period t, the 
output gap, xty, is determined by equation (13). The output gap, in turn, determines all 
relevant state variables in  ) ( R c u 1 , , , 1 + + t t t t π , except for the shock. Hence, when evaluating 
  21Et(VR), the shock at t+1 is the only unknown state variable. Let us consider, as an 
example, the case when circumstances, including the policy response, are such that 
) ( 1 t t t c π − +  is positive. The higher Rt+1 the more the impact of  ) ( 1 t t t c π π π − +  on 
estimated persistence will be scaled down (in equation (7) – with a one-period lead - the 
residual is scaled by the inverse of the moment matrix). This is, in itself, positive. 
However, there is an additional effect. The moment matrix is very persistent; if R is large 
today it will remain large in the near future. That, as we have seen before, is good if 
estimated persistence is low, but unfortunate if it is high. 
We illustrate these arguments using two specific examples. In figure 5, we consider the 
case of a zero cost-push shock and lagged inflation. This implies πt=0 as well. In such a 
case we have already seen that there will be no immediate updating of estimated 
persistence. Thus, we manage to isolate the intertemporal effects associated with the 
moment matrix. Figure 5 (c) plots the partial derivative VR, for different levels of 
estimated persistence, against the cost-push shock at time t+1. As expected the derivative 
is positive for low values of c, negative for large values of c. There is an intermediate 
value for which the partial derivative is zero (which happens to be about 0.34 in our 
example). 
[Insert Figure 5] 
Alteratively assume that lagged inflation is still zero but the cost-push shock at time t is 
such that it implies a one standard deviation movement in inflation at t. Clearly, there will 
be an updating of estimated persistence. Considering the case when c=0.5 figure 5 (a) 
illustrates the association between VR and the shock at t+1. As expected, from our 
discussion around figure 5 (c), the partial derivative is mostly negative and only changes 
signs for relatively large values of the shock. As we conjectured before, the opposite is 
true when estimated persistence is low, as we can see from figure 5 (b). In this case, the 
partial derivative is mostly positive and only changes sign for negative (and large) cost 
push shocks. 
 
  224. Some sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section we analyze how some of the results depend on the calibrated parameters. 
First, we investigate how the results change with a different gain, a different degree of 
price stickiness and a different degree of intrinsic inflation persistence. Second, we look 
at the impact of reducing the weight on output gap stabilization in the central bank’s loss 
function.  
[Insert Figure 6] 
 
Figure 6 plots the realization of the average perceived inflation persistence in economies 
with different gains and two different degrees of price stickiness (α=0.66, corresponding 
to our baseline calibration and a higher degree of price stickiness, α=0.75). The other 
parameters are as in the calibration reported in Table 1. We focus on the perceived degree 
of persistence because this gives an idea about how the trade-off between lowering 
inflation persistence and stabilizing the output gap changes as those parameters change. 
As discussed above, when the gain is zero, the optimal policy converges to the simple 
policy rule and the estimated degree of persistence equals the degree of intrinsic 
persistence in the economy (0.5 in the benchmark case). In this case, the central bank can 
no longer steer inflation expectations and the resulting equilibrium outcome is the same 
as under rational expectations. Figure 6 shows that an increasing gain leads to a fall in the 
average perceived degree of inflation persistence. With a higher gain, agents update their 
estimates more strongly in response to unexpected inflation developments. As a result, 
the monetary authority can more easily affect the degree of perceived persistence, which 
affects the trade-off in favor of lower inflation persistence.  
Finally, we look at the impact of increasing the weight on output gap stabilization in the 
central bank’s loss function. Figure 7 shows that increasing the weight λ  from 0.002 to 
0.012 shifts the distribution of the estimated degree of inflation persistence to the right. 
The mean increases from 0.33 to 0.45. A higher weight on output gap stabilization makes 
it more costly to affect the private sector’s estimation of the degree of inflation 
persistence and therefore leads to a higher average degree of inflation persistence.   
  23[Insert Figure 7] 
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
 
In this paper we look at optimal monetary policy when private sector expectations are 
determined in accordance with adaptive learning. In the literature on the systematic 
conduct of monetary policy or, in other words, on monetary policy rules there is a tension 
between two conceptions of the role of model-based policy rules in deliberation, 
justification and communication. In the first concept, rules (optimal or otherwise) are 
regarded as simplifications, approximations, or rules of thumb. By being simple, rules, 
according to this view, fulfill a pedagogical and steering function, while, at the same 
time, succeeding in summarizing a large number of, historically determined, particular 
choices. From such a viewpoint, rules work, as descriptions of how policy is actually 
conducted, as far as they correctly describe ex post the decisions taken by successful 
central bankers. In the same vein, but more modestly, such rules may identify important 
considerations that a wise policy-maker always takes into account. According to such 
concept the characterization of monetary policy plays mainly a descriptive role. 
In the second concept, general rules are used as benchmarks that can be used to assess 
particular decisions taken. According to such a view the idiosyncratic can never be 
salient. The correct viewpoint is to look at particulars as instances of the universal 
approach. According to such a concept optimal monetary policy rules fulfill a 
prescriptive role
12. We have found that, even in the context of an over-simple model, the 
characterization of optimal policy becomes very involved. It is easy to imagine how 
much more difficult such a characterization would become if we would try to reckon the 
complexity of actual policy choices and the prevalence of economic change. Such 
considerations clearly limit the possibility of using our framework in a prescriptive way.   
Therefore, we interpret our contribution in the spirit of the first conception. Specifically, 
we view optimal monetary policy under adaptive learning as illustrating (once more) why 
medium term price stability and anchoring inflation expectations is key in environments 
characterized by endogenous inflation expectations. In our set-up, it is the case that 
  24optimal policy will manage private sector expectations, pushing perceived persistence 
below endogenous persistence in the model. It does so by responding strongly and 
persistently to past inflation and inflation shocks when perceived persistence is relatively 
high. Thus, optimal policy succeeds at stabilizing inflation and at anchoring inflation 
expectations at no cost – in our example – for output gap stability. 
In any case, we think that the contrast between the ability of a simple rule and of optimal 
policy to maintain stability, when the system is buffeted by stochastic disturbances, 
brings us back to Machiavelli, who wrote: “[Fortune] shows her power where virtue has 
not been put in order to resist her and therefore turns her impetus where she knows that 
dams and dikes have not been made to contain her.”
13
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
13 Prince, chapter 25. 
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Table 1: Relevant parameters for the benchmark case. 
β   γ   λ   θ  α  φ   κ   σ 
0.99 0.5 0.002    10  0.66 0.02 0.019 0.004
 
 
Table 2: Summary of macro-economic outcomes 
 
Rational Expectations Adaptive  Learning 
 
Commitment Discretion Sophisticated Simple  Rule 
Corr(xt, xt-1)  0.66 0 0.51  0 
Corr(πt, πt-1)  0.24 0.50 0.36  0.56 
Var(xt)  1 0.95  0.95  0.95 
Var(πt )  1 1.85  1.28  2.18 
Var(πt −γπτ−1)  1 1.37  1.13  1.48 
E[Lt]  1 1.28  1.09  1.37 








Notes: Var(xt), Var(πt −γπτ−1) and E[Lt] are measured as ratios relative to commitment 
 
  26Figure 1: The distribution of the estimated inflation persistence (a), output gap (b), inflation (c), quasi-
difference of inflation (d) and the moment matrix (e). 
 
(a)  Estimated inflation persistence 













(b) Output gap 











  27(c) Inflation 












(d) Quasi-difference of inflation 














  28(e) R – moment matrix 




















  29Figure 2: The mean dynamics of the output gap, inflation and the estimated inflation persistence following 
a one-standard deviation cost-push shock 
 
(a) Output gap 
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(c) Estimated inflation persistence 
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Figure 3: The policy function output gap as a function of lagged inflation and the estimated degree of 
inflation persistence.  
(a) 
 
(b) Difference x(sigm,.)-x(0,.) 
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Figure 4: Illustration of symmetry in the response of policy (output gap) to inflation and deflation 
  
(a) Inflation annualized 















(b) Output Gap 
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(c) Estimated c 










  34Figure5: VR  for different estimated persistence parameters. 
(a) VR after positive shock, high estimated persistence parameters. 
 













(b) VR after positive shock, low estimated persistence parameters. 











(c) VR zero shock, zero lag inflation, different estimated persistence 
parameters.













  35Figure 6: Sensitivity analysis: Average estimated persistence in function of the gain and 
the degree of price stickiness.  
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